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Static Analysis of The DeepSeek Android App
Abdul Dieter edited this page 3 months ago
I carried out a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to determine possible security and personal privacy problems.
I've discussed DeepSeek formerly here.
Additional security and personal privacy issues about DeepSeek have been raised.
See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek
The findings detailed in this report are based simply on static analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive proof that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants analysis, specifically offered the growing concerns around information personal privacy, monitoring, the possible abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between worldwide powers.
Key Findings
Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration
- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising concerns about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure identifies these in the iPhone app the other day also.
- Bespoke encryption and data obfuscation techniques exist, with indicators that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user details.
- The app contains hard-coded public keys, rather than depending on the user device's chain of trust.
- UI interaction tracking records user behavior without clear consent.
- WebView control is present, which could allow for the app to gain access to private external web browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
A considerable part of the evaluated code appears to concentrate on gathering device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
- The app gathers various special device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details. - System properties, installed packages, and root detection mechanisms recommend prospective anti-tampering steps. E.g. probes for the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security scientists utilize to root their Android devices.
- Geolocation and network profiling exist, showing prospective tracking capabilities and enabling or disabling of fingerprinting routines by region.
- Hardcoded device model lists recommend the application may behave differently depending upon the discovered hardware.
- Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out extra gadget details. E.g. if it can not determine the device through basic Android SIM lookup (because authorization was not given), it attempts producer particular extensions to access the exact same details.
Potential Malware-Like Behavior
While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, numerous observed habits line up with recognized spyware and malware patterns:
- The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which might facilitate unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks. - SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unidentified purposes.
- The app implements country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible security systems.
- The app implements calls to pack Dex modules, wiki.rrtn.org where additional code is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime.
- The.so submits themselves turn around and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to fill additional.so files. This facility is not normally examined by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
- The.so files can be executed in native code, ura.cc such as C++. Making use of native code includes a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the full level of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily escalate opportunities, possibly exploiting vulnerabilities within the os or device hardware.
Remarks
While data collection prevails in modern applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a valid email, which ought to currently offer enough authentication. There is no legitimate factor for the app to strongly collect and transmit distinct gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
The degree of tracking observed here surpasses typical analytics practices, potentially making it possible for persistent user tracking and re-identification throughout gadgets. These behaviors, integrated with obfuscation techniques and network interaction with third-party tracking services, require a greater level of scrutiny from security scientists and users alike.
The work of runtime code loading as well as the bundling of native code recommends that the app might permit the release and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a major prospective attack vector. No proof in this report exists that from another location deployed code execution is being done, only that the facility for this appears present.
Additionally, the app's method to detecting rooted gadgets appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is frequently warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material defense are vital, or in competitive video games to avoid unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such stringent measures in an application of this nature, raising more questions about its intent.
Users and companies thinking about setting up DeepSeek ought to be aware of these prospective risks. If this application is being used within a business or government environment, additional vetting and security controls ought to be imposed before permitting its deployment on handled gadgets.
Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based on static code review and does not suggest that all discovered functions are actively utilized. Further investigation is required for definitive conclusions.